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”Do You Have a Conscience?”
Jeremy Bendik-Keymer
Elmer G. Beamer–Hubert H. Schneider Professor in Ethics, 
Case Western Reserve University
1. “Do you have a conscience?” There was a time when this would have 
been a question that was immediately intelligible to people, like asking 
whether a person holding a ball can throw it. For much of the history of 
philosophy—that ancient Greek invention—the name for what allows one 
to stay in touch with moral principles in the midst of particular decisions 
was “conscience” (Langston 2001). To ask whether I have a conscience was 
tantamount to asking whether I can keep my decisions moral, whether I 
was capable of being a mature human being. Since morality is the domain of 
duties of humanity within the larger ethical pursuit of the good life—that is, 
since the moral is a necessary condition on living an ethical (good) life—to 
ask whether I have a conscience was tantamount to asking whether I can be 
ethical at all (Bendik-Keymer 2013). Serious stuff.
2. Do we have a sense of what it would be to have a conscience? Centuries 
before conscience become suspect in twentieth century “Western” culture, 
the moral framework for conscience had lost much of its metaphysical base, 
including its moral psychology (Anscombe 1958; MacIntyre 2007).1 A world of 
theologically grounded moral principles had come apart as the modern ideas 
of autonomy and then of the individual arose on secular or cross-religious 
grounds (Schneewind 1997; Renault 1997; cf. Marx and Engels 2002, 219–233 
“Bourgeois and Proletarian”). Although an alternative grounding and psychol-
ogy for conscience arose almost simultaneously (see §8), its coalescence and 
1.  “East” and “West” are relative terms generated by the history of colonialist geography. 
Although not all bad origins are bad results, the inevitability of the categories is worth 
throwing into question, not only because of the dichotomies created (or rationalized 
after being produced), but also because of the simplifications that occur. For instance, the 
“Middle East,” equally a product of this geography, includes traditions such as Islam that 
are both “Western” and regularly excluded from that adjective in contemporary “Western” 
discourse. Moreover in Arabic, dhameer, the word for conscience, maintains an active hold 
in culture, and one can invoke it easily and readily. The issue of cultural geography may be 
an issue this journal wants to address as it aspires to “global” ethics.
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institutional organization have been slow in the making. In contemporary 
philosophy, we are still searching for the mental groove that would allow us 
to see the necessity of conscience without theological underpinnings. This 
is true even for theists, since conscience claims universal authority, and that 
authority can be interpretable in theistic terms but cannot be reducible to, 
or dependent on, them.
Without conscience’s moral framework, it was inevitable that suspicion 
about it would arise, and until conscience’s mental groove becomes widely 
intelligible, that suspicion is unlikely to abate. To see popular, intellectual 
examples of the suspicion, we can look at Nietzsche (1989) or Freud (1961). 
Each made conscience less a guide than a repression. Conscience, differently 
on each of their accounts, keeps down vital human instincts and narrows 
the breadth of human being. It is also a hindrance to passionate openness, 
although each understood “passion” and “openness” in different ways. In clas-
sical terms (Aristotle 2002), each portrayed conscience as a block to human 
flourishing—an ethical suspicion.
By contrast, to see where the moral suspicion coalesced in popular and 
academic culture, we can look at the numerous figures of professionals of 
“conscience”—from Nazis to bureaucrats of war, to those who manage 
exploitative endeavors. These people threw conscience into wide moral and 
philosophical disrepute. They appeared to have consciences, claimed they 
were conscientious as can be, and yet we saw in them inhumanity. Inhumane, 
blinkered, unjust, each became a living reductio ad absurdum of the moral 
grounding of conscience.
Consider Adolf Eichmann. According to Hannah Arendt (2006), Eichmann 
lived by his conscience, a conscience that on her analysis was not properly 
“thoughtful” (individual and autonomous). His banal evil revealed the mod-
ern moral condition of the professional, manager, or bureaucrat—and then 
of anyone who does his duties submerged in the role he finds in society. 
The offensive and easily misleading figure of “little Eichmanns” points to a 
ubiquitous phenomenon: failing a clear, universal moral framework, modern 
people easily compartmentalize their duties within their jobs and claim to 
be honoring their consciences by doing their jobs, whatever they might be. 
Integrity, a potentially amoral concept, becomes more central to people’s 
preoccupations than humanity or social justice.2 Recent historians of ethics 
2.  This focus on (professional) integrity with a de-emphasis on social justice is often found 
in university discourse surrounding ethics as a mission goal, or as the goal of a professorship 
or professional ethics program.
2
The International Journal of Ethical Leadership, Vol. 1 [2012], Art. 14
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol1/iss1/14
The International Journal of Ethical Leadership   Fall 2012 54
have noted that the problem raised by the specter of the inhumane but 
“conscientious” bureaucrat has become one of the most gripping forms 
under which the concept of evil is held (Neiman 2002). 
Even if Arendt’s assumption that Eichmann did have a conscience may 
not hold up to closer biographical scrutiny of the deeply self-serving man 
(Cesarani 2007), sociologists of bureaucracy have noted far more subtle, 
believable, and common ways in which organizations create incentives and 
disincentives that lead to the avoidance of responsibility, putting on moral 
blinders, and other forms of essentially inhumane treatment (Jackall 2010). 
The result has been understandable skepticism about conscience. Do we have 
a sense of what it means to have a conscience?
3. The obvious response is to insist that people such as Eichmann did not 
actually have consciences, or had defective ones (cf. Cesarani 2007). But 
what this assertion raises is the question of how conscience is supposed to 
be a distinct facet of moral life different from, say, moral principles. Why do 
we need conscience as a concept for moral life if what we really care about 
is whether or not a person acts according to moral principles or ethical 
virtues? Why not just substitute “humanity” or social justice for talk about 
“conscience”? 
One traditional way of understanding conscience was to appeal to con-
science to show one what to do. But if that appeal risks evil without the prior 
appeal to moral principles, it appears that conscience is either redundant or 
mysterious, or both. This is a more serious matter than the skepticism. It is 
a theoretically grounded claim to conscience’s irrelevance. Once again, we 
have the problem of lacking a clear sense of the mental groove that would 
make conscience an obvious and necessary part of moral life.
4. Yet something has been emerging in moral philosophy and in humanist 
culture over the past three hundred years, and this emerging mental groove, 
allied often to the word “conscience,” makes conscience neither redundant 
nor (pejoratively) mysterious. Rather, it makes conscience the fulcrum of 
moral life. 
What has been emerging is fragmentary and appears in many shapes. We 
have to learn to grasp it as through shimmering water. It has been develop-
ing for centuries, slowly departing from the traditional understanding of 
conscience (Bendik-Keymer 2002, ch. 1 and 2). According to that tradition, 
conscience brought principles and particulars together—it honored God’s 
3
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commandments in life.3 But “God”—understood as a precritical mythol-
ogy—is dead because we killed “him” (Nietzsche 2001; Schneewind 1997, 
Renault 1997; cf. Marx and Engels 2002). And whatever is today divine 
must emerge within humanity’s sense as the core of that sense, not as its 
commandment (Nancy 2008). Conscience, then, would have to be basic to 
our sense, prior even to our principles.
People have been searching for that sense. In the emerging mental groove 
that I will discuss tonight, conscience is better thought of as the capacity 
keeping open our awareness of persons. To fail to have conscience, on this 
understanding, is to fail to have a moral universe in which persons are 
qualitatively different than objects and in which, by virtue of being different 
than objects, persons have claims on us and on each other—claims to worthy 
treatment. We will see why this shift in the sense of conscience both answers 
the problem of Eichmann and meets the need for a new framework for 
conscience. We may even glimpse why affirming life (pace Nietzsche 1989) 
and opening up our nonneurotic relationships with others (pace Freud 1961) 
depend on conscience!
5. Yet there is more to our situation. As the twenty-first century opens, do 
we have a stable sense of the personal? Over the last half century, just as 
the background for a new understanding of conscience began to coalesce, 
problems of scale arose, most of them environmental. These problems of scale 
pose the following challenge: based on a fictional awareness of persons born 
of imaginative projection, they honor the personal; but they are truly imper-
sonal. They appear to be both matters that ought to be on our consciences 
and yet matters that cannot be on our consciences. 
Due to our species-level affect on future generations, all of whom are 
impersonal to us, people of conscience today must not only hold onto their 
awareness of persons and the morality such an awareness involves but also 
keep in view the effects of our species as a whole on far future generations 
and on the world of life that will enable or disable these generations of 
3.  The most excellent recent treatment of conscience is Dean Moyar’s Hegel’s Conscience 
(2011). However, Hegelian conscience remains theologically framed by the problem 
of principles and particulars, even while the heteronomous base of that frame in blind 
obedience to commandments has dropped out. What is interesting in Moyar’s Hegel is the 
emergence of the personal as a category of moral authority. However, Hegel failed to grasp 
the logic of human relationship. His theory of recognition notwithstanding, Hegel places 
too much emphasis on cognition, whereas the relational is for the most part pre-cognitive 
and pre-self-conscious (Levinas 1998).
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innocent persons. The result is a complicated dynamic: to be both personal 
and seemingly impersonal, even before one makes decisions or figures out 
what moral principles should guide one’s behavior. Confusing stuff.
6. The terms of the complex situation surrounding conscience are pro-
vided by what I call “relational reason” and by what I call “the problem of 
aggregate effects.” Much of this paper will be focused on explaining each of 
these concepts and the associated families of concepts that each opens up. 
Relational reason has been emerging. But the problem of aggregate effects 
faces us increasingly in the twenty-first century and beyond. It threatens to 
dislodge our sense of conscience as a personal concept.
Relational reason is the form of reason by which persons try to connect 
with each other, beginning first with responding to each other as persons. The 
space and the need for relational reason have been opening up in modern 
discourse since at least the eighteenth century (especially Hunt 2008 on the 
intersection with human rights discourse). There have been many forays into 
this domain. One could look at the eighteenth century’s fascinations with 
moral sentiments, whose most recent form is found in cognitive science work 
on empathy (Jack 2011) or in Martha Nussbaum’s (2007) ethics of compas-
sion. Or one could turn to the twentieth century’s focus on intersubjectivity 
and “relations with the other” in philosophy, sociology, and literary theory, 
especially in Emmanuel Levinas’s unsurpassed final treatise Otherwise than 
Being (1998). Even so-called analytic philosophy has come on strong in the 
domain of the personal, whether through work on “social ontology,” as seen 
by the likes of John Searle (2003), or through the contemporary discourse 
of the “second-person standpoint” (Darwall 2006). All of these present an 
alternative to both theoretical and practical reason, one that often draws on 
emotional capacity to recognize and connect with others, and one whose 
fundamental category is that of the person, or the personal.4 The key thing 
here is that people cannot be reduced to either theoretical or practical objects 
without violence being done to them. 
7. The problem of aggregate effects is best indicated by what Stephen Gar-
diner calls “the pure intergenerational problem” (Gardiner 2011, ch. 5). 
4.  Perhaps we should align relational reason with the leadership discourse of “emotional 
intelligence” (Goleman 2006). Relational reason seems central to emotional intelligence, 
although emotional intelligence is also present in practical reason (e.g., hope) and in theo-
retical reason (e.g., wonder). Thanks to Drew Poppleton for this connection to leadership 
discourse.
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The aggregate effects of our species’ form of power are forecast to deeply 
affect future generations, not just of humans but also of our planet’s spe-
cies (specifically the valuable phylogenetic lineages that make up the deep 
branches of the tree of life as it has come to us). The problem of how to 
understand justice in light of the problem of our aggregate effects on future 
generations sweeps out to sea most of the existing theories and institutions 
by which we claim political legitimacy and moral authority (Gardiner 
2011, ch. 3–7). It will dissolve the social contract tradition as we know it 
and the legitimacy of the post-Westphalian political order because of their 
incapacity to claim moral authority concerning intergenerational and global 
problems (cf. Nussbaum 2007). The pure intergenerational problem also 
reveals the potential of economic systems to externalize costs. More than 
that, it undermines the power of relational reason. The dynamic tendency of 
the problem of our aggregate effects on future generations is toward being 
impersonal, not personal. 
8. I need to simultaneously familiarize us with the mental groove that will 
give conscience authority and frame the problem of aggregate effects in such 
a way that we can at least see the outlines of what could sweep these last 
centuries of humanist culture out to sea. I’ll start with relational reason. Since 
the eighteenth century, “conscience” has increasingly become the location of 
interpersonal (face to face) awareness in practical life, foremost through the 
concept of conscience found in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
in the twentieth century’s major moral discovery—nonviolence as a discrete 
political (and not simply religious) methodology (Bendik-Keymer 2013). 
These are very widespread and well-known moral discoveries. Human rights 
discourse brings us face to face with the claims of others to our—or the 
state’s—humanity. Nonviolence brings us into a visceral, embodied practice 
of activating elementary, human compassion and respect (cf. Glover 2001). 
The question for our purposes is, what is the logic of the awareness found 
in these widespread phenomena?
9. To begin answering this question, we need to raise, briefly, one more basic 
question: what is a form of reason? We need a basic enough answer to this 
question to begin articulating the logic of relational reason. We need to 
understand what a rational process is and the way rational processes are part 
of human vitality. Admittedly, these are vast and highly complex topics in 
philosophy that I can only sketch here.
6
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A rational process is a logic expressing a fundamental mode of being human. 
That is, through rational processes, we make sense as humans and in a variety 
of ways that goes to showing how to be human is to be dynamic, shifting 
between different modes of being. There are three such rational processes or 
fundamental ways of our being—theoretical reason, pursuing truth; practical 
reason, pursuing the good; and relational reason, pursuing (primarily human) 
connection. These processes are rational in that they involve reasons. 
What, though, are reasons? Again, the answer can only be a placeholder 
because the topic is so complicated. Briefly, reasons are considerations in 
favor of some goal, that is, truth, the good, or connection. As considerations, 
they express the summation of thoughtful attention to what will achieve 
the goal in question. 
For example, suppose that I want to know whether it is going to rain today. 
My goal is the truth about the weather. Consulting my Internet weather 
report, I discover that today is supposed to be sunny. Since I believe the 
report to be largely accurate after living with it for some time and seeing 
its accuracy, I have reason to believe that it will probably not rain today. If 
someone asked me, “Why do you think it probably won’t rain today?” I can 
reply, “It probably won’t rain, because my trusted weather report says it is 
unlikely.” Here, a theoretical reason—a reason about the truth of some state 
of affairs—serves me in my process of determining what is true. 
The fact that theory, practice, and relating—the three rational processes or 
ways of our being—have different logics can be seen fairly quickly once we 
switch our attention to what a practical reason does. It involves a different 
kind of consideration altogether. With theoretical reasoning, we seek truth 
and do so by attempting to secure justified true belief, that is, knowledge. 
Our reasons are explanations. By contrast, with practical reason, we seek the 
good and do so by attempting to arrive at reliable calculative know-how. Our 
reasons are casuistry or justification. We want to know what we have to do 
(not believe) in order to (called the calculative relation) realize, express, or 
produce what we take to be a facet of the good life. The very concept of the 
good underscores the difference here. We don’t ask whether, say, going down 
Henry Street as opposed to Mitchell Street is “true.” We ask whether it is a 
good thing to do given that we want to save some time on our way to work. 
This is a different kind of evaluation, an evaluation of action, not of belief. 
Moreover, someone engaged in practical reason is expected to do some-
thing, not simply think something. If I were to seek to figure out what to 
do, develop a belief about the answer, and then not act, I would have either 
7
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switched my intention or not be deliberating at all. Deliberation is action-
oriented. You can’t stay in your head with it (cf. Vogler 2002 against the “big 
head” theory of reasons for action). And to know how to act is different from 
having a lot of knowledge. In fact, many people have excellent know-how 
but can’t even express the beliefs that would unpack what they know in their 
hands, so to speak (Crawford 2009).
10. All this helps us frame the contrast with relational reason. Relational reason 
is the process of seeking how to be with someone. To use technical vocabulary, 
relational reason concerns subjects, not objects. That is, it concerns persons. 
When I try to know something, I treat it as an object of explanation. 
When I try to do something, I treat it as an object of action, achieved and 
to some extent ideally mastered by my know-how and justified in terms 
of my agenda. But when I try to be with someone, I am not subjecting an 
object to my knowledge or action. Rather, I am being subject to another 
who remains herself a subject, and should I take her as an object, or she me, 
we lose our connection. 
Reasons offered here are like advice but also like psychology. They position 
me to see the other, to be open to her, to hear not so much what she says 
or what she’s doing, but her (Kenaan 2005). Relational reasons are locators. 
The fundamental logical category of relational reason is that of a person. 
Along with that category comes an entirely different set of distinctions, a dif-
ferent form of reasoning, and different values. We will explore all these shortly.
11. Someone might object: Don’t we know stuff about intimates all the time? 
Don’t we use psychology to know stuff about intimates? Isn’t intimacy basi-
cally grounded in knowledge, that is, in a theoretical way of being? 
Or if it isn’t, don’t we try to know how to hang out with our friends 
and family, or at least wish we knew how? Isn’t intimacy basically a practice, 
something we do or enact? In other words, isn’t what I consider here a 
discrete logic, that of connecting with a person, really reducible to theory 
and/or to practice? 
But here’s the problem with the objection. When I want to connect with 
a person, I have to bracket what I know, to be open to her. In fact, whatever 
I know, in a live connection, must be brought back to her, for her hearing, 
so to speak. The necessary ways I objectify her are continually subject to her 
subjectivity, that is, to her not as an object but as a source of agency, belief, 
and connection. 
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And so, too, with know-how. Intimacy is anything but a practice of manipu-
lating an object. Undoubtedly, I use all sorts of know-how to figure out how 
best to be around someone with whom I am familiar. I might know how 
to phrase advice or chill out when the person is stressed. I might know 
how to make the person happy. And so on. But all of these essentially—and 
benignly—calculative relations depend on my staying in touch with her. And 
that staying in touch, that connection, is a relational matter that I cannot 
force into actuality, just as love cannot be forced out of the look of another.
The point here, as I will explain shortly, is that theoretical, practical, and 
relational reason are codependent, cooperative, and co-original in being 
human, such that the three always go together in a complex balance.5 Yet at 
the same time, insofar as we isolate the logics that conjoin to make being 
human dynamic, relational reason is discrete—as I’ve just shown, the logic 
of connection is. It is reducible neither to theory nor to practice, even if it 
works with each in a whole human life.
12. There are more distinctions to familiarize us with relational reason. One 
of the most elementary focuses on the values of each rational process we’ve 
been discussing. In a concise form, they are:
The value of theory is the true. After all, those who try to know, such as 
scientists or historians, aim at truth. Whether a process of knowing has gone 
well or not is in large part decided by whether the process has been guided by 
what is true. When it has not, the process is taken to be defective in some way 
and is criticized by what is true, that is, is subjected to the authority of truth.
By contrast, the value of practice is the good. As Aristotle (2002) first pointed 
out, to act is to aim at an apparent good, a goal valued as good. Another way 
to put this is that our purposes are usually taken as desirable to ourselves. In 
this way, if an agent starts doing things that aren’t good by her lights, she is 
expected to correct her course. If she doesn’t, her practical reason is taken 
to be defective—e.g., masochistic or neurotic—in some way.
Relational reason ends up having a far different value than either theoreti-
cal or practical reason because the value of relating is the beautiful. This may 
seem odd at first. For much of the past two hundred years in philosophy, 
beauty has become an aesthetic concept (Harries 1998). But the beauty of 
5.  Wisdom, on my account, has the logic of coordinating this complex balance, and the 
virtue of wisdom is to have achieved the right balance. Wisdom is like the charioteer driv-
ing the competing horses in the image of the soul from Plato’s (1995) Phaedrus. I explore 
the idea in a book project called φ and our Being: Modes of Discipline in the Beauty of Life. 
9
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relating is not an aesthetic concept. This makes its use, precisely, postaesthetic. 
I take beauty, repeating a sense found in Plato (1989) and developing a sense 
found in late twentieth-century phenomenology (Marion 2007) to mean 
the harmony between two souls. Just as we seek truth when we try to know, 
and seek what is good when we deliberate, so we seek harmony between 
souls when we connect. You are with your other, hovering and alight in that 
connection with the entire universe appearing open around you for the 
duration (Marion 2007).
13. Another distinction I like between the rational processes is more symbolic 
than explanatory. Still, it is worth mentioning here because it is memorable. 
It is this: You might commonly hear that knowledge resides in the head and 
that know-how lives in the hands. Relating, then, comes from the heart. 
That there are such shopworn distinctions between the head, the hand, and 
the heart should be seen only as confirmation that there is nothing unusual 
about isolating relational reason. We do it all the time—although we may 
not know we are doing it. 
14. Another, this time technical, distinction that allows us to isolate relational 
reason comes by reference to its end state, that is, the thing that concludes 
the process under question. Processes, after all, work toward a conclusion. 
What is remarkable in light of our discussion is that the ontology of the 
three rational processes is different in each of the processes’ conclusions. By 
“ontology” I mean the kind of thing that concludes the process.
Take knowing. When we know, we try to figure out what we believe. So 
the process of knowing ends in a belief, one valued for whether it is true. 
Beliefs are propositional—that is, the way they are structured as the kind of 
thing that they are.
By contrast, when deliberate, I try to figure out how to act. The process 
of practical reasoning ends properly in a deed, one that should be desirable 
to me. Actions are intentional, that is, the way they are structured as the kind 
of things that they are.
However, when I try to connect with someone, well, I try to connect! The 
process of relating ends in a connection. It is even more precise to emphasize 
the point this way: we connect. This is an interpersonal event. That is the way 
connections are structured, the kind of things that they are.
This last set of contrasts underlines the different logic of relational reason, 
since its end cannot be intended. One can only put oneself in a position 
10
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to connect. People often call this “relating”—putting oneself in a position, 
trying, to be with another. Yet connection depends on a meeting. So the 
completion of relational reason, which is between subjects, involves two, 
whereas theoretical and practical reason, each working on objects, can be 
accomplished by one. And this last point about the nature of meeting as an 
actual event, will be important later tonight for understanding why conscience 
is challenged by the problem of future generations.
15. Everything I have pointed to so far is of a logical nature. That is, it sets 
out the discrete categories and rough form of reason and of reasoning for 
each rational process. An indirect, nonlogical support to establishing relational 
reason as a discrete rational process may come from cognitive science. What 
is interesting is that the underlying brain process of each rational process 
appears to be different. 
Cognitive scientists now know that the human brain has discrete cycles 
when dealing with experience. One cycle is analytic, and the other is largely 
empathic (Jack 2011). It would seem that theoretical reason draws primarily 
on the analytic cycle. Relational reason, by contrast, appears to draw on the 
empathic cycle. Practical reason, however, is interesting in it would appear 
to strongly involve both cycles in measure. At the same time, know-how 
appears to use muscle memory to a great extent (Crawford 2009). Some call 
this “the intelligence of the hands.” 
Does our very physiology mark out the rational processes? If so, the 
underlying biological difference would indirectly support, while not directly 
showing, that different logics are in question. 
16. Having, I hope, put us in a position to understand the mental groove 
of relational reason, we can now turn to a more complex point that will 
solidify our understanding. How do the rational processes interrelate in a 
dynamic human life? Trying not to belabor the topic but also trying to keep 
us aware of relational reason, I’ll use three sets of distinctions: codependence, 
co-originality, and cooperation. 
First, each rational process is dependent on the others. I can’t know how to 
swim here if I don’t know that we have a deep enough river. Practice depends 
on theory. Similarly, I can’t know that we have a deep enough river here if I 
don’t know how to confirm the fact (so lab technicians, deeply engaged in 
the theoretical project of science, must equally be good with their hands). 
Theory depends upon practice.
11
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But that isn’t all. Humans live socially. Accordingly, our propositions are 
linguistic, which means their form is intersubjective. Another way to mark 
this is to notice that language is useful for and dependent on connection 
between people, that is, on speaking (Levinas 1998). Speaking is guided by 
relational reason, just as addressing is. The life of propositions depends on 
connection between people.
Something similar can be said of our intentions, too. Part of being a practical 
reasoner is being able to respond to questions such as, “Why are you bending 
your knees and pointing your hands?” Answer: “In order to dive into the 
river” (cf. Vogler 2002). Practical reasoning has intersubjective address and 
connection as conditions on our life with it. Once again, sociality, dependent 
on connection, is built into the space of practical reason, just as it is built 
into the space of theoretical reason. Theory and practice depend on relating.
We have already considered, too, how connecting with others depends 
on alternating between knowledge, know-how, and connection. To be good 
at connecting with you, I need to know how to connect with you. Should 
I be direct or indirect? Should I take my time or get to the point? But to 
answer these questions, I need to know some things about you.6 I need to 
know whether you are a thick-skinned person or are rather sensitive to 
confrontation. I need to know whether you are patient or impatient. All the 
rational processes are thus dependent on each other.
17. So much for codependence. “Co-originality” indicates that no one form 
of reason can be reduced to another. Due to the different logic of concepts 
involved, relating can’t be reduced to knowing or to know-how. If it could, 
for instance, then knowing about you could substitute for connecting with 
you. Or knowing how to manipulate you could substitute for genuinely 
being with you. Yet by merely stating these conditionals, we can see that 
they are false. I can know everything in the world about you and still not 
connect with you. And not only does my ability to manipulate you not 
demand that you connect with you, but it would seem to preclude it! Even 
if one objected that excellent manipulation sometimes seduces connection, 
6.  As I will shortly explain (in §17), although relating depends on know-how (practice) 
and knowledge (theory), it isn’t reducible to them. This point is important to keep in mind 
lest we turn relating into manipulation (know-how) or objectification (knowledge), both 
of which, of course, are the negation of authentic relating, even if they are partially needed 
to position oneself for the actual connection and its emotional understanding. You don’t 
relate to someone if what you are basically doing is manipulating or objectifying her.
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the fact that it is of a different order can be seen once the seduced person 
discovers the manipulation. She understandably feels violated, as if her free 
subjectivity were taken from her. As we said, know-how objectifies through 
its techniques. But connection is intersubjective.
We can rehearse similar arguments for both knowledge and know-how, 
showing how each can’t be reduced to another. Briefly, if knowledge could 
be reduced to know-how, then knowing how to drink water would give me 
knowledge of what water and drinking are, chemically and biologically. True, 
I might pick up a working sense of some of water’s properties and of some 
of the body’s physiology by drinking water, but knowing how to drink water 
still would be no substitute for the chemical and biological elaboration of 
H
2
O. Likewise, if knowledge could be reduced to relating, then my facility in 
connecting with you would imply that I know you objectively. But isn’t one 
of the hard truths of relationship that we can be easily deceived about what 
kind of person another is simply because we can connect with him or her?
Lastly, if know-how could be reduced to knowledge, then a comprehen-
sive knowledge of the physics of engines would be a substitute for knowing 
how to fix an engine, which it patently is not (Crawford 2009)! Similarly, 
my deep connection with another would imply that I know how to live 
with her. Yet another hard truth about relationship is that connection does 
not imply practicality.
The point here concerning co-originality is subtly different than the one 
surrounding codependence (§16). Not only do the three forms need each 
other to function in a human life; the three cannot be built up out of each 
other. This point lends weight to the idea that what we have here are three 
basic ways of being human that cannot be streamlined away but demand 
instead the wisdom to know their balance, know-how to balance them, and 
be capable of relating that balance well in a life with others. 
18. So much for co-originality. The three cooperate in a dynamic human life, 
too. Their cooperation is a measure of what Aristotle (2002) would think of 
as a good human life, one that is functioning well (cf. Foot 2003). 
We can see the general point about human life when we focus in on a 
specific context, such as a role in human life. What it takes for the role to 
function well suggests to us what it takes more generally for a human life 
to function well. Take as an example a lab technician. Not only must she 
know how to put an experiment together so as to seek the truth, she must 
also be able to relate well with her fellow technicians and investigators. If 
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she cannot do all these things well enough, her ability to function well as 
a lab technician will be inhibited. The cooperation of theory, practice, and 
relating is essential to her functioning well. She has to be practical and social 
enough to effectively seek the truth.
Take, too, the manager—an apparently practical role, managing a function 
in the larger collective agent that is a corporation. If she isn’t knowledgeable 
about her domain (isn’t an authority), and doesn’t know how to work well 
in her domain (isn’t effective), and doesn’t manage to effectively connect 
with others (isn’t “good with people”), she will not be much of a manager 
at all (cf. Jackall 2010). Functioning well as a manager depends heavily on 
balancing relating with others, moving tasks along, and knowing the facts 
concerning one’s work (and any technicalities of its product or service), cor-
poration, community, legal system, political system and especially economy. 
Once again, theory, practice, and relating must cooperate for someone to 
flourish in the workplace.
The general point here holds as well, I believe. In the contemporary Anglo-
phone Aristotelian tradition (cf. Aristotle 2002, Foot 2003, Nussbaum 2007, 
and Thompson 2008), much weight is put upon the possibility of articulating 
the conditions on living a good life for a member of our kind (i.e., a good 
human life) simply from attention to the form of human life. I believe that 
the three rational processes and the balance that appears demanded between 
them indicate at least some general constraints on what a good—that is, 
well-functioning—human being is. These constraints are similar to those 
given by, for example, being able to roam and range, mate and rear for a 
horse. Without being able to do these kinds of things specific to horse life, a 
horse isn’t a healthy, able horse (cf. especially Foot 2003). The good life for a 
horse is diminished for it. That our constraints come from kinds of reasoning 
gives us a more open nature than a horse, as the entire modern tradition has 
seen since Giovanni Pico dell Mirandola (1996) and is a centerpiece of much 
current work on being human (Nancy 2008, 2010; Bendik-Keymer 2006).
Are there any exceptions, any people who would not need to be well 
rounded between theory, practice, and relation in order to flourish? Perhaps 
only the beautiful soul, as Hegel understood (1979; VI:C:c), could live almost 
exclusively through empathic resonance with the rest of the world, that is, 
through relational reasoning.7 But as Hegel showed, such a life is not recog-
7.  It is interesting that Hegel, following Schiller (2005), identifies beauty with the space 
that should be explained by relational reason. Perhaps Hegel has a similar sense of beauty as 
the one I’ve indicated in this essay.
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nizably flourishing because the beautiful soul still has to eat (act) and know 
the refrigerator from the washing machine (have true beliefs). So much for 
the exclusively beautiful soul.
The point is that living a whole human life involves dynamically negotiat-
ing many ways of being human as these are expressed in different ways as we 
reach out to consider what we seek. When Giovanni Pico della Mirandola 
(1996) inaugurated Renaissance humanism by underlining how the essence 
of being human is exercising our judgment, he was scarcely aware that reason 
is multiple. Yet his point was true—the main part of what makes being human 
difficult is that we have to find ways to live by the lights of reason.
19. We can now return to conscience as the capacity keeping open our 
awareness of persons. The point, clearly, is that such a concept of conscience 
is relational. We are now, I hope, more familiar with that mental groove—are 
closer to locating it inside ourselves and, more importantly, between ourselves. 
It is a moral foothold.
Lodged in the midst of practical life—and so in practical reason—con-
science has a special function in keeping us aware of relational matters as we 
act. The voice of conscience is the voice of relational reason within practical 
life (Bendik-Keymer 2013, cf. Levinas 1998, pace Velleman 1999). Some 
people call conscience “the voice of common humanity” (Bendik-Keymer 
2002, ch. 3–5).
At the center of the concept of conscience is the relational logic that 
invokes the categorical distinction between persons and objects. This cat-
egory of the person, which gives us our relational landscape once we stand 
within the mental groove that is relational reason, is central to the dynamics 
of conscience. As we will see shortly, the possibility of resolving the tension 
between the personal and the seemingly impersonal problem of justice to 
future generations depends on the abstract category of the person—and 
of a set of related concepts that I will discuss later: the person-trace, and 
the person-projection. For now, though, please notice how the concept of 
conscience understood relationally avoids the objections to conscience with 
which I began today. First, Eichmann did not have a conscience, or at least 
had a defective one. He ignored the people his affections affected. He did so 
rigorously. Eichmann didn’t have momentary lapses of attention. He positively 
hid behind his professional duty so as to avoid the people his orders caused 
to be shot and gassed. If conscience is the capacity within us to remain aware 
of the claims of persons, Eichmann had no conscience.
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Second, relational awareness of other people is not a moral principle. It 
is a basis for the development of any moral principles worthy of the sense 
of humanity. Accordingly, conscience is not theoretically redundant or mys-
terious, at least in the sense of having no theoretical role. If conscience is 
mysterious, it is so in other meaningful ways, which literature explores (cf. 
Dostoevsky 1996).
Third, to affirm our evaluative powers in the midst of our most open and 
thriving experience of being human—to affirm our life (Nietzsche 1989)—
depends on the open “infinity” (Levinas 1998), that is, being human, our 
great capacity for connection.8 We need conscience to remain open to each 
other and so to remain open to the fullness of life, pace Nietzsche!
Fourth, neurosis is precisely the closure of our capacity to connect with 
others as persons. In neurosis, both I and others become objects to my uncon-
scious acting mechanically (cf. Guattari 2010). What would psychic health be 
here if not an open and working conscience—a world where “subjectification” 
(Guattari 2010), that is, being a person in personally fulfilling relationships 
with others, were possible again for me?9 Accordingly, we need conscience 
as a foothold to undo harmful patterns in our relations to ourselves and 
to others, pace Freud (1961) and the—thankfully waning—psychoanalytic 
distrust of conscience that was a feature of much twentieth-century culture 
in Europe and North America especially. 
20. To have a conscience. To not lose a sense of persons. Emmanuel Levinas 
spoke of being “responsible,” in the sense of always able to respond to oth-
ers, because aware of them as demanding a hearing, of never being mere 
objects (Levinas 1998, ch. 2). The thought is actually found in Kant when 
his explanation of good will implies that every person demands being given 
reasons that she can find acceptable for any way in which she becomes a 
means to one’s ends (Kant 1998, sec. II). It is implicit in the development 
8.  Cf. Nancy 2010, who links our “infinity” with our capacity for “being in common” as 
mutually reinforcing existential conditions of humans.
9.  Both Guattari and his long-time collaborator Deleuze had misgivings about the term 
“person,” which they saw as a functionally bourgeois term bound up with exploitation, 
oppression, and repression—most centrally around what they took to be the repressive 
“machine” of the “self,” a peculiar construct. In other writing, perhaps I will have the space 
to explain why their view of the personal is problematic due to their own lack of a grasp 
of relational reason. For Guattari, only theory and practice carve up the world, even in 
“desire”—a point that partially explains the impersonal and meaningless void, even depres-
sion, at the center of their lives and work. See Dosse 2010.
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of the currently cutting-edge topic of “the second-person standpoint” as a 
fundamental to the moral point of view (Darwall 2006). 
However, what Kant missed and Levinas understood was the full-bodied 
nature of relational awareness—how awareness of persons, and so of con-
science—is as much a matter of body language, eye contact, and, in a word, 
“heart” as it is a matter of conscious reason.10 It is largely precognitive, such 
that relational reason processes in part through a precognitive intuition (what 
the phenomenological tradition Levinas was in called “passive synthesis” and, 
in Levinas’ language, “anarchy”), through what Jonathan Glover (2001) calls 
the “human responses.” Perhaps that is why conscience is meaningfully mys-
terious at times, even though it is also very clear and cut and dried at others. 
When we are turned around by the presence of someone, claimed by our 
sense of people near us, what is happening? The idea implicit in relational 
reason is that we are entering into a certain kind of relationship. In his 
groundbreaking work on practical logic, Michael Thompson (2008) speaks 
of the “gear shifts” that thought takes. These “gear shifts” are shifts in logic 
and lead to entirely different ways of representing the world, for instance, 
between representing a thing as a self-guided life form as opposed to a simple 
nexus of physical laws arranging matter.11 Much the same can be said of seeing 
someone—seeing a person. To be aware of persons is to enter into a kind 
of relationship where subjects, not objects, are the primary focus, as I have 
already said. We are called on, diverted, summoned, disturbed, and turned 
around by people. We have to train ourselves to resist being so. We have 
to attend people—or drown them out. Or rather, people attend us, in the 
precise sense of holding onto (in French, “tenir,” to hold) us. We can learn to 
twist away, but we have to achieve a certain kind of discipline to do so—the 
discipline Eichmann had and the conscienceless bureaucrat has. The mental 
groove of relational categories comes to us through others, is reinforced 
through time and attention, and is dislodged only with effort, which is why 
nonviolence works over time.
10.  There does not need to be body language for there to be a genuine connection, but it 
helps. One can understand, for example, email’s difficulty in this light. People do sometimes 
connect through bare, electronic words—even without knowing each other. There is a 
strange poetry to it. At the same, as most people in organizations know, email is often as 
much a problem as a useful tool, for while it increases efficiency, it also increases point-
less misunderstandings due to the absence of tone, body language, and other human cues. 
Roger Saillant’s piece in this journal may need to consider more closely the lack of rela-
tional reason in the Information Age. He infers that the “information” age is the relational 
age, but there are reasons to be skeptical.
11.  See part one, “The Representation of Life” (Thompson 2008, ch 1–4).
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If we are turned around by the presence of people, what are the conse-
quences of acknowledging people thoroughly (cf. Cavell 2002)? When a 
person cannot be reduced to being an object without violence being done 
to her very nature as a person, many things must change about how decisions 
are made, how interactions occur, how consequences are conceptualized, 
even how information is shared as communication. The personal becomes 
important. We have to hear the “personal” in the “interpersonal.” I can’t 
explore these changes in any detail here. But they affect how institutions 
should conduct their business and how we should conceive of our roles 
within society. I wish only to leave to your imagination all the work that 
can be done here as we try to make modern life and modern work more 
humane (cf. Zeldin 1994).
If we explore the personal as a category, however, we should explore it 
cross-culturally. I believe that conscience as the location of the mental groove 
of relational reason allows for a universal moral psychology that can bring 
closer together deep cultural traditions in the “East” and the “West.” This has 
already begun around the discourse of emotional intelligence, for instance 
(Goleman and the Dalai Lama, 2004). Things are flowing.
21. But unless we are careful, an undercurrent will sweep them out to sea. 
The problem, as I’ve said (§5), is that while we must reside in the personal 
to be humane, the gravest moral problem—the gravest threat to persons—
arises entirely impersonally and seems to demand impersonality of a sort 
that defies (my) simple conceptualization. There is an undercurrent beneath 
the stream we’ve been exploring, and it pulls our moral systems out into the 
unknown, throwing their authority into question—even our ability to remain 
comfortably in the mental groove we’ve sunk into today, together. The only 
foothold I have in this problem is the concept of our aggregate effect on 
future generations. Thankfully, as we shall see, perhaps some of the categories 
of conscience may help sort out the aporia and help us cross the river.
22. What are aggregate effects? Commonly, when ethicists consider collectives, 
the idea of an intentional collective, a group agent, is in mind. Corporations 
are group agents. So are states, and teams. In each case, the collective qua 
collective is bound by a part–whole ordering in which the parts of the col-
lectives (which may be collectives themselves, e.g., a project team, or a city) 
understand themselves as joined to the collective in terms of the common 
agenda or constraints on any agenda before them. Usually their agenda is 
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minimal: to profit, in the case of a corporation; or to subsist or to improve, 
in the case of a state. Similarly, if one part of the collective is asked what it 
is doing as a member of the collective, it can explain itself in terms of the 
collective end, such as when a task force can explain its role within a corpora-
tion. If the part can’t explain its role, that is taken as a problem.
By contrast, some large-scale problems—especially environmental ones 
(but also macroeconomic ones)—are not produced by any collective agent. 
They are produced by an aggregate collective. This is a set of agents joined 
as agents only by the way their individual actions produce a net sum effect, 
unintentionally.12 The collective here is relative to the effect, so to speak, not 
to the intention. Whatever identity the agents in the collective share, it is not 
one by which they identify themselves as agents with an agenda in common. 
Aggregate collectives are just groups of actors doing their own thing.
Aggregate collectives cause a problem due to the unintentional effects they 
produce. Take the cases of the following large-scale environmental changes: 
deforestation, overhunting or overfishing, toxic contamination of ecosystem 
chains on a large scale, massive species loss (with the risk of a cascade to mass 
extinction), the ozone hole, climate change, and now ocean acidification. 
All these problems of scale are the result of unintentional actions carried 
on by agents—individuals, corporations, states, and so on—over time, with 
the individual effects adding up slowly to produce the problem threatening 
future generations and sometimes even current ones.
From an ethical standpoint, the challenge of such problems of scale is that 
they are caused unintentionally. Usually this challenge takes people immedi-
ately to the question of institutional design, as in the classic case of tragedies 
of the commons (Hardin 1968). The idea is that we need to design incen-
tives, disincentives, or regulations better so that myopic actors—that is, actors 
acting only as individuals without awareness of what others are doing—do 
not aggregate to produce unintended, bad effects. But for many of the cases 
facing us, due to the problem of future generations, we have no institutional 
answers, nor even adequate concepts to approach finding them (Gardiner 
2011, ch. 5, 7). Because we cannot cooperate with the future, the problem of 
future generations is not a tragedy of the commons, and we do not have an 
understanding of political legitimacy that could allow us to approach it yet.
12.  As Drew Poppleton notes, “From an environmental standpoint, all of us [could] be 
lumped into one collective[,] because together, though acting largely independently, we are 
[causing massive environmental problems].” Poppleton, commentary on this paper, April 
2012, Case Western Reserve University.
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23. Nonetheless, when an aggregate collective produces an unintentional, bad 
effect on a massive scale (and the scales are both spatial and temporal—usu-
ally both global or at least regional and extending far into the future), the 
question of what form our social organization takes is the right one. I call 
this topic the question of the form of power. 
The form of power is the organization any collective has (intentional or 
aggregate) so as to produce the effects that it does. “Power” here is under-
stood simply as the causal ability to produce specific effects, namely those 
that affect valuable things, respect-worthy beings, or persons. Through the 
lens of the form of power, one can approach, say, the collective effects of 
the “Western” nations over the past two hundred years in contributing to 
climate change without having to assume intentional coordination. One 
can ask simply, how was society set up such that individual agents—persons 
or states, for instance—could produce the amount of greenhouse gas forc-
ing that they did? And the answer would include such things as a system 
of knowledge (and of ignorance), a system of politics (and of antagonistic 
national self-interest), a system of economics (that externalized the costs of 
pollution), and so on. The form of power is the complex architecture of all 
of these systems insofar as, through their organization, the collective produces 
the effects it does, unintentionally.
24. The ethical—and precisely moral—dimension of a given form of power 
hits home once we consider the problem of future generations. Following 
Gardiner (2011), we can point out that future generations of people do not 
cause what they inherit and, by virtue of being clearly a future generation 
(and thus not an extension of our generation), have no reciprocal relationship 
with the present generation. 
Gardiner defines future generations through these two conditions of 
causal impotence and nonreciprocity so as to avoid the case of reciprocity 
across families between, say, grandparents and grandchildren. His point is 
that there will be some set of future people who do not have any reciprocal 
relations with us. These people are clearly future generations in a morally 
nonarbitrary sense (Gardiner 2011, ch. 5). To speak of the generation not 
being arbitrary is to claim that the number of years postdating us does not 
make people belong to a new generation. Rather, the fact that they stand in 
morally significant relations with us gives us a principled reason for a division 
between generations. Which relations? The two given by the two conditions: 
the future people are passive to our actions and have no basis for reciprocity 
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with us. This would not be true for our grandchildren. They have some power 
over us and some ability to be reciprocal with us. But far-future people, as 
I like to call them, have no interpersonal connections with us. They cannot 
have them, nor can we.
The problem in a form of power, then, comes from this: future genera-
tions are faced with the unintentionally bad consequences of our aggregate 
collectives. They are faced with having to pay the costs of our actions and 
to pick up the responsibility for what we do. Moreover, they will suffer the 
risks of what we have caused and will have to deal with the incapacities a 
harsher planet might offer.13
These are no trivial things when it comes to thinking of affecting adults, 
who should be one’s moral equals. But the matter is much more severe once 
one considers that, morally speaking, anything bad we externalize onto future 
generations affects children first. Each person in future generations begins as 
a dependent and an innocent child. 
Insofar as the unintended consequences of our aggregate actions push bad 
(and in the case of the environmental issues mentioned earlier, sometimes 
really bad) things onto future generations, our form of power is pushing these 
things onto innocent children. And there is nothing morally worse, more 
negligent and reprehensible than that. Nothing at all in the world. There are 
only equally awful things people can do to each other.
25. Many of the aggregate effects that we are considering are either epochal 
or species-historical (Bendik-Keymer 2012; and Thompson and Bendik-
Keymer 2012, ch. 13). They are epochal insofar as they are the result of 
an epoch of human history, for instance, the industrial epoch of mass scale 
production based on fossil fuel in the case of climate change and chemical 
contamination.14 They are species-specific insofar as they seem to be the result 
of the total effects of our species since even before recorded history (that is, 
since before 8000 BC), as in the case of elevated species extinction risking 
a cascade into the Earth’s sixth mass extinction (Pinet 2009). 
Both the epochal and the species-historical are massive scales for the 
aggregate, let alone for the spatial and temporal effects of that aggregate. Not 
surprisingly, within these scales, the question of the form of power admits 
of highly complicated and as yet unarticulated (or not yet fully articulated) 
analysis (Thompson and Bendik-Keymer 2012, esp. ch. 13). As Gardiner (2011) 
13.  Cf. Hertsgaard 2011, although he does not focus far enough into the future.
14.  This appears to be Roger Saillant’s focus in his contribution to this issue of the journal.
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and Thompson (in Thompson and Bendik-Keymer 2012, ch. 1) have pointed 
out so well, what is at stake, really, is the moral responsibility to change the 
form of our civilization. Anything else ends up being reprehensible. 
26. What categories should guide this social reform, and how should con-
science figure into it? Changing our civilization is not something individuals 
can do. As individuals, our actions have no consequence at the scales we are 
considering. The only thing of consequence is to change the patterns in our 
civilization that produce injustice. These patterns are what Iris Marion Young 
(2010) called “structurally unjust.” They make it so that individually decent 
people who don’t mean to do anything bad are complicit in large-scale pat-
terns that produce equally large-scale injustice. Here there is a disconnection 
between individual decency and the overall immorality of one’s context (cf. 
Thompson and Bendik-Keymer 2012, ch. 13). Responsible people must 
accordingly change the context.
27. How? Only through what Young calls “civic action.” Only by acting in 
the role of an individual addressing the public sphere and its responsibility 
for one’s society’s organization can one discharge one’s responsibility to face 
down structural injustice. It is the nature of structural injustice to persist 
precisely because one’s society allows it. Only civic engagement on behalf 
of societal transformation can possibly follow through on the moral charge 
associated with the problem of aggregate effects.
Certainly, then, we can’t do without conscience. Precisely by only doing 
one’s job according to one’s society, that is, precisely by allowing oneself the 
same excuse as Eichmann made, we are all today complicit in large-scale 
structural injustice. People accordingly ought not to simply do their jobs—
they should allow their consciences to break through the impersonal roles 
of unjust institutions. Acting for the sake of justice, they must be active and 
transformative citizens. 
In the case of many environmental problems, however, they must take 
on both our epochal and species-historical form of life. And this is no small 
thing. It utterly exceeds anything people of conscience can personally do or 
imagine. Likewise, it exceeds all their relationships and even their relational 
abilities. We are losing our foothold again.
28. Far-future oriented citizenship proceeds in light of highly impersonal 
considerations. The future generations one’s collective affects are faceless and 
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abstract—and so are the distant ancestors (e.g., in 9000 BC) or contemporaries 
(around the globe in places one has never seen) who produce these problems 
of usually global scale. Moreover, whereas one might conceivably learn to 
understand one’s way into the place of those in the past or around the world, 
to project one’s own imagination onto the future is fantasy. We have no idea 
how future people will be. There is no interpersonal connection in sight 
here, only an abstract fantasy as a placeholder for the moral point of view.
Can I have a conscience, then? These dynamics I’ve discussed tonight 
move almost schizophrenically into personal relationship and away from 
personal relationship toward the most general impersonality imaginable, that 
of a species perspective. Each direction comes from an awareness of persons, 
true, but the one is visceral and real, and the other largely imaginary. The 
personalizing vector moves people of sound conscience toward ever-greater 
relationships centered around the autonomy and individuality of subjects, 
that is, around people’s voices (and body language), consent (and opening 
up), and dignity. It searches out oppressive and exploitative circumstances, 
the stunting of human freedom, and whatever lets people end up as objects. 
Within appropriate boundaries, it reaches toward the humane, the intimate, 
the familiar, and the personal. It seeks to connect, to meet, to pay attention 
to another’s subjectivity, that is, to her freedom.
Against this dynamic we find also a different vector that moves toward 
restraining our form of life from doing anything that it knows to be risky, 
problematic, or wrong to children coming into this world. We may not know 
what exactly children of the future will need as persons, but we should not do 
anything that affects them that we presently think, on reflection, is question-
able. So this dynamic abstracts away from the intricacies of personal life to 
study and to conceptualize our form of life as a whole, its aggregate collective 
effects, its form of power, and what we need to do to restrain that form of 
power within the bounds of what we take, to the best of our knowledge, to 
be entirely responsible and just to children coming into this world. At best, 
this is a hand stretched out to a connection that could only be received in 
imagination by the people of the future, themselves recognizing that we acted 
as if we could connect with them.
29. The personalizing dynamic moves to the here and now, before you. 
However, the impersonal dynamic moves to the there and then, before an 
abstract mirror of ourselves as responsible—or not—in the anticipated but 
also entirely imaginary eyes of those to come. 
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Moreover, the personalizing dynamic individualizes relationships, which 
in turn open up the differentiation of each party, each individual. However, 
the impersonal dynamic moves to lose individual relationships in lieu of an 
anonymous belonging to our form of life as it lives up, or fails to live up, to 
its sense of justice. 
The one dynamic is intimate and personally, emotionally engaging (Dos-
toevsky 1996). The other is impersonal, coldly sobering, and emotionally 
engaging only for those who have internalized the claims of citizenship 
deeply (Young 2010).
Can we clearly conceptualize this torsion to conscience such that “con-
science” has a coherent logic rather than a merely conventional and arbitrary 
list of causes? Yet it would seem to violate conscience, to, say, simply shear off 
the problem of aggregate effects. That would really put my conscience at sea.
30. At present, what I can say clearly is that the category of the person allows 
one to make the relevant abstraction into the far future. The category of the 
person is a relational category, as we’ve seen. Yet it is entirely empty because 
it awaits the subjectivity of the other. Really, the category of the person is a 
frame for connection with others holding open a different kind of interaction 
than would be possible under purely practical categories. In fact, we have a 
name for this different kind of interaction. We call it a relationship.
Although, then, we cannot relate with the far future, we can project 
relational categories into the future in much the same way as one awaits 
connection when trying to relate. Trying to relate to the future is, paradoxi-
cally, possible in this case where actual relationship is impossible. Moreover, 
the category anchoring relationship—that of the person—seems to demand 
that we try to relate even though we cannot actually relate. I call this demand 
in the abstract a “person-trace” in our consciences.
A person-trace in our consciences allows us the possibility of a person-
projection. This is an abstraction belonging to relational reason whereby, due 
to a person-trace in our heart, we project personhood where we don’t actually 
connect with persons. The possibilities of person-projection deserve to be 
explored. I have explored them somewhat in our moral concepts relating to 
other animals (Bendik-Keymer 2006, lecture 4), but they present themselves 
clearly with respect to far-future people.
Moreover, justice is a practical concept (cf. Aristotle 2002, bk V) that 
protects relational matters (cf. Thompson 2004). It is one of the prime areas 
where practical and relational reason cooperate, supporting each other. Justice 
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protects the possibility of people—and so protects the possibility of people-
projections (cf. Nussbaum 2007, including her approach to other animals). 
The point is important here because what conscience appears to demand 
(due to the people-traces that the thought of far-future generations invokes 
in us) is intergenerational justice in the absence of connection. Since justice is 
a practical condition on connection, striving for justice toward future people 
appears consistent with keeping open the space for people, that is, with trying 
to connect through the category of projected persons.
To be fully given, all of oneself, to those with whom one interacts and 
yet to be nameless and irrelevant except as a function of one’s form of life, 
trying to keep it from failing itself miserably in the (projected) eyes of future 
people, this is the complex of conscience that makes asking whether you (the 
one asking yourself) have a conscience no mere rhetorical or judgmental 
question. It would seem to take art, or excellence, to have a conscience. Cer-
tainly, it demands—perhaps a new kind of—maturity and much imaginative 
projection.15
If I were to hazard a deduction, it would be that the leaders of tomorrow 
must be excellent at this dynamic, relational conscience. Despite themselves, 
they must work tirelessly to salvage our form of life in the eyes of future 
children, disciplined in projection, clearing mindfulness to listen to the people-
traces in their hearts. They must show far-reaching common humanity and 
deep connections with others as they do it. If they fail to do either thing—fail 
to work to restrain our civilization, thinking of it at a great level of abstrac-
tion and approaching projection with anything less than a geological time 
scale (Pinet 2009), or if they fail to connect with others now, fail to attend 
to people here and tonight with a great deal of humanity—they fail to have 
a conscience. They either become self-absorbed in their own generation or 
they become impersonal, inhumane.16 
15.  The closest I have come to glimpsing this almost geologically timed projection came 
in reflecting on Alex Shakar’s novel Luminarium (2011), which explores a roughly (Zen) 
Buddhist trajectory of losing the self in experiences of the whole continuum of life. What 
strikes me as promising here is the continuity that exists within Buddhism between rela-
tional reason—one of the virtues of Buddhism’s emphasis on compassion—and a cosmic 
perspective that would seem to speak to the pure intergenerational problem, albeit through 
an ironically worded metaphysics of “reincarnation” (for reasons I cannot go into here, I 
believe that Buddhist philosophy of language largely makes its publically recognized meta-
physical principles ironic). Of course, my use of the category of a person jars substantially 
with Buddhism, however—as does my differentiation between self and other implicit in 
relational logic and my understanding of psychic health.
16.  Of course, the conditions of leadership sketched here are necessary, not sufficient, for 
accomplishing what leadership must effect: societal or large-scale organizational change. As 
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31. As the twenty-first century breaks over us with its increasingly ominous 
problems of vast spatial and extended temporal scales, our consciences are 
the site within each of us of a civic responsibility born of our relational sense 
of humanity. The complexity here is that what civic responsibility demands 
exceeds how we actually relate, and yet conscience without its relational 
dimension is inhuman, impersonal. The problem of this essay has been how 
to conceptualize the demands of conscience when one must be pulled both 
toward the interpersonal and toward the aggregate effects of our civilization’s 
form of power, that is, toward the impersonal. The challenge that people must 
meet if we are to keep our footing as moral agents going into the future is 
how to combine within one conscience the dynamic tension between the 
personal and the impersonal, between the urgency of face-to-face relations 
and the silent, remote scale of the entire life of our species.
Even if we cannot actually relate to the far future, our relational capacities 
allow us to try to relate through the idea of the projected person. Far future 
people should invoke people-traces in anyone with a conscience. We should 
feel inside us the pull of future children, pure categorical ideas that demand 
our greatest moral responsibility. I do not think it is histrionic to say that 
we should be haunted by “them.” 
32.
I take Ignatia for grief.
Acconite for shock.
Chamomilla for anger which out of nowhere like a slap.
Herbs for retained placenta.
Needles for retained placenta.
Needles for weak pulse, for grief, for shock, for disappointment.
I drink wine, coffee and take pills except
I don’t, not yet, just in case.
In case hiding. In case mistaken.17
I have argued elsewhere (Bendik-Keymer 2012), the nature of structural injustice in the 
form of power of our aggregate collectives demands civic activism to reorganize crucial 
aspects of society such that the structural injustice is remedied. Single leaders rarely accom-
plish such a thing. They need, rather, to be good at leading social movements or complex 
organizations to take on structural injustice effectively.
17.  Zucker 2009, “Welcome to the Blighted Ovum Support Group,” 39.
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